Taiwanese authorities charged the Chinese captain of the cargo vessel Hong Tai 58 this month for damaging an underwater communications cable that connects Taiwan to the Penghu Islands, located near the Chinese coast. This legal action highlights the growing tactic of targeting vital seabed cables, which is challenging to prove and has become part of gray-zone strategies aimed at exploiting weaknesses in an adversary’s defenses.
The Hong Tai 58, a Togolese-flagged cargo ship crewed by Chinese sailors, was detained by Taiwan’s coast guard in late February. A similar incident was reported in January when a Hong Kong-owned commercial vessel was implicated in seabed cable damage north of Taiwan. Notably, Taiwan has recorded five instances of seabed cable damage in the current year, surpassing the three incidents reported in both 2023 and 2024. As a precaution, Taiwan’s coast guard has established a blacklist of nearly 100 ships suspected of having ties to China.
Observers, despite Beijing’s denials, suggest that such saboteur actions form part of China’s coercive strategy against Taiwan. During a congressional hearing, U.S. Senator Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) expressed strong concerns about China’s aggressive activities, particularly the sabotage of undersea cables, which U.S. Navy Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of Indo-Pacific Command, acknowledged as a reality in the region.
Weeks after the seizure of Hong Tai 58, it was revealed that the China Ship Scientific Research Center had patented a deep-sea device capable of severing underwater communication or power lines. Such capabilities could be crucial in efforts to isolate Taiwan during potential major hostilities, such as a naval blockade or invasion, which would likely disrupt civilian and military communications.
In response to these potential threats, Admiral Paparo proposed two countermeasures during his testimony. The first involves intelligence gathering to penetrate the targeting chain and deploying forces effectively to deter cable sabotage. The second emphasizes resilience, advocating for redundant communication networks and numerous satellite constellations to maintain an uninterrupted information flow.
The growing threat has led to a burgeoning market for naval tech companies to develop solutions for underwater infrastructure protection. Companies like Saab Australia emphasize their capabilities in critical undersea infrastructure defense through mine countermeasure solutions. They highlight the effectiveness of Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) for monitoring and seabed sensors for real-time maritime awareness.
Additionally, developments such as a French military contract for Exail to produce an AUV capable of diving up to 6,000 meters demonstrate advancements in countering seabed warfare. This vehicle, which will be operational by 2027, can reprogram itself mid-mission, enhancing its ability to monitor suspicious activities. Thales Australia is also innovating with technologies like the Blue Sentry, which uses a sophisticated sensor network to detect potential threats.
Strategic experts, including Ross Babbage, CEO of Strategic Forum in Australia, argue for a comprehensive national response to the undersea threat. Concerns about ships deviating from their normal routes call for improved surveillance techniques to identify and address anomalies effectively. The Australian Defense Department has asserted that the military has various capabilities to monitor and mitigate threats to undersea communications, collaborating with cybersecurity agencies to enhance protection, although many details remain classified.
Gordon Arthur, an Asia correspondent for Defense News, concludes that addressing emerging threats to undersea infrastructure is becoming increasingly critical as nations pivot towards enhancing their defense capabilities in the face of evolving geopolitical tensions.
