The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy now includes multiple warship classes, fifth-generation fighters and an expanding submarine force. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command leader Adm. Samuel Paparo described China’s maritime activities as illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive.
Western strategists should question if they understand the extent to which China values sea power as an enabler for grand strategy, rather than projecting their own expectations onto Beijing. Policymakers should frame their understanding of China’s view on sea power through three key questions.
First, China’s employment of naval force differs from Western approaches. Chinese carriers stay close to home, while Western navies prioritize open ocean operations for power projection. China may view carriers as a mark of superpower status rather than for similar operational purposes.
Second, China does not seek maritime partnerships like the U.S. Navy does. While the U.S. values multilateral maritime partnerships, China’s approach is unilateral and skeptical, avoiding opportunities for collaboration and interoperability.
Third, China does not use overseas naval facilities like Western navies do. China has limited military facilities abroad, preferring direct commercial investment over military base construction. Western assumptions about China’s use of overseas facilities could lead to inaccurate policy decisions.
It is important for the U.S. and its allies to avoid mirroring their own perceptions onto competitors like China. Understanding different views on sea power can help shape effective naval strategies and resource allocation for the future.
